Normative liberal theory and the
bifurcation of human rights
Monique Deveaux*
Department of Political Science, Schapiro Hall, Williams College, MA, USA
Abstract
This article argues that liberal arguments for human rights minimalism, such as those of John
Rawls and Michael Ignatieff , contain fundamental inconsistencies in their treatment of core rights
to life and liber ty. Insofar as their versions of minimalism foreground rights to physical security and
basic freedom of movement, they cannot coherently exclude cer tain social and economic
protections and liber ties that directly suppor t or are even partly constitutive of these rights. Nor
do they have good grounds for putting the social and private realms wholly beyond the pur view of
international law. ‘New’ human rights that represent an expansion of civil rights in particular
beyond the classic conception to encompass, for example, the right to freedom from sexual and
gender-based violence, illustrate especially well the extent to which civil, social, and economic
rights violations, and their remedies, are deeply interwoven. These emergent rights also directly
challenge the dichotomy between the public/political and private/social realms, and the corollar y
assumption that human rights violations occur mainly or exclusively in the former sphere. While
the concerns that motivate arguments for human rights minimalism*considerations of pluralism
and prudence*are legitimate, proponents would do best to reconsider the multiple roles that
human rights in fact play, in spite of their essentially contested status.
Keywords: human r ights; sexual and gender-based violence; social and economic r ights;
civil liberties; John Rawls; Michael Ignatieff; domestic violence; human trafficking; public
and private
Ethics & Global Politics
Vol. 2, No. 3, 2009, pp. 171
http://www.ethicsandglobalpolitics.net/index.php/egp/article/view/2055
Monique Deveaux, Normative liberal theory…
Normative liberal theory and the
bifurcation of human rights
Monique Deveaux*
Department of Political Science, Schapiro Hall, Williams College, MA, USA
Abstract
This article argues that liberal arguments for human rights minimalism, such as those of John
Rawls and Michael Ignatieff , contain fundamental inconsistencies in their treatment of core rights
to life and liber ty. Insofar as their versions of minimalism foreground rights to physical security and
basic freedom of movement, they cannot coherently exclude cer tain social and economic
protections and liber ties that directly suppor t or are even partly constitutive of these rights. Nor
do they have good grounds for putting the social and private realms wholly beyond the pur view of
international law. ‘New’ human rights that represent an expansion of civil rights in particular
beyond the classic conception to encompass, for example, the right to freedom from sexual and
gender-based violence, illustrate especially well the extent to which civil, social, and economic
rights violations, and their remedies, are deeply interwoven. These emergent rights also directly
challenge the dichotomy between the public/political and private/social realms, and the corollar y
assumption that human rights violations occur mainly or exclusively in the former sphere. While
the concerns that motivate arguments for human rights minimalism*considerations of pluralism
and prudence*are legitimate, proponents would do best to reconsider the multiple roles that
human rights in fact play, in spite of their essentially contested status.
Keywords: human r ights; sexual and gender-based violence; social and economic r ights;
civil liberties; John Rawls; Michael Ignatieff; domestic violence; human trafficking; public
and private
Ethics & Global Politics
Vol. 2, No. 3, 2009, pp. 171
http://www.ethicsandglobalpolitics.net/index.php/egp/article/view/2055